Winning the Cost-Per-Kill Battle

The conflict highlights not only the scale of the threat, but also the urgent need for effective and cost-efficient countermeasures. At its core, this is an economic contest: NATO cannot afford to defeat cheap drones primarily with expensive missiles or complex systems. The decisive question is not only technical effectiveness, but sustainable cost-exchange ratios at scale. 

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems rely on three core elements:

• sensors – the eyes of the operation,
• command-and-control systems (C2) – the brain,
• and effectors – the means to neutralise threats. 

Advanced sensors, such as Saab’s world-leading Giraffe 1X, already enable precise detection and classification of very small targets. Depending on the target type, range, and environmental conditions, the radar can detect objects with a radar cross section of less than 0.01 square metres. However, increasingly sensitive sensors also generate vast amounts of data that must be analysed in real time.

Modern C2 systems, supported by growing processing power and, increasingly, by artificial intelligence, can process these data points within fractions of a second. Yet in today’s drone-saturated battlespace, effective Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) depend less on a single command system and more on a resilient, networked ecosystem. 

This networked approach integrates sensors, shooters, electronic warfare and human-machine teaming with rapid feedback from the front line. The network must tolerate degradation, integrate new sensors and effectors quickly, and support decentralised execution. The side that can detect, classify, prioritise and engage faster – while maintaining a favourable cost ratio – will have the advantage. The resulting situational awareness enables rapid decision-making and supports the selection of the most suitable effector.

Soft kill vs. Hard kill 

The choice between soft kill and hard kill is, at its heart, an economic decision: electronic attack where possible; guns and mobile fire teams where appropriate; low-cost interceptor drones for mass threats; and high-end missiles reserved for the most demanding targets. Matching the right effector to the right threat at the right cost is what determines whether C-UAS architecture is sustainable at scale. This logic applies whether systems are intended to protect civilian infrastructure in peacetime or frontline troops against drone swarms and applies whether they are built around military-grade (MOTS) or commercial (COTS) components.

Ukraine’s experience shows that C-UAS is becoming an attritional economic contest. While a drone may cost only a few hundred euros, advanced defensive systems can cost millions and often require long production times.

To address this challenge, Saab is developing “Nimbrix”, a low-cost fire-and-forget missile designed specifically for counter-drone operations. Offering a range of 2 - 4 kilometres, the missile uses an active seeker and an air-burst warhead capable of defeating drone swarms. The system is designed for both independent operation and integration into larger air defence architectures.

Nimbrix is a low-cost, fire-and-forget missile designed for a threat environment increasingly shaped by the proliferation of UASs.

Innovation at speed – and the pace set by Ukraine

Drone warfare evolves at exceptional speed, but the pace in Ukraine goes beyond mere acceleration. Ukraine is not operating on a faster version of the traditional cycle; it is operating on a fundamentally different one. Frontline feedback, civilian technology, startups and rapid prototyping are compressed into weeks or even days, while offensive drone tactics and ISR capabilities shift significantly every three to four months. 

For NATO, this is a direct challenge: a conventional procurement process will struggle to keep pace with a threat environment where both drones and counter-drone systems are updated continuously. C-UAS must therefore be treated as an adaptive capability – built around mechanisms for continuous integration, testing, fielding and replacement – rather than a fixed programme with a defined endpoint.

To keep pace with this development, Saab relies on a continuous operational feedback loop between users, deployed systems, engineering teams, and industrial partners. Lessons from exercises, operational use, and conflict environments where Saab products are employed are captured and fed rapidly back into system development, software updates, integration work, and tactical adaptation. This ability to shorten the loop between battlefield experience and industrial response is becoming as important as the technology itself.

A notable example is the “Loke” concept, developed through cooperation between the Swedish Air Force, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), Saab, and partners. In only 84 days, a mobile and adaptable C-UAS solution for combat units was developed and fielded.

The modular system covers the full kill chain and combines the proven Giraffe 1X radar with a lightweight SHORAD-based C2 solution. Effectors, such as a small gun mounted on a Trackfire remote weapon station, complete the concept. These systems can operate on land platforms or naval vessels such as Saab’s Combat Boat 90 and have already been deployed and proven in a live NATO mission at Malbork Air Base in Poland between April and September 2025.

Instead of following traditional multi-year development cycles, the concept relied on repurposing existing systems and rapidly integrating new functions and technologies – the natural result of Saab’s role as a systems integrator rather than a platform vendor, drawing on an open, technology-agnostic architecture that prioritises integration over reinvention. The result is a scalable and adaptable solution that can evolve with emerging threats. Loke can also remain operational while moving, ensuring continuous protection during relocation.

There is no perfect system

Saab is already a leader in hard-kill effectors for large drones and aerial threats such as aircraft and helicopters – with systems like the RBS 70 NG, which is laser-guided with a man-in-the-loop and therefore unjammable. As part of a broader System of Systems concept, the RBS 70 NG integrates both missiles and surveillance capabilities on the same platform, enabling several different effectors to operate together in a unified architecture. Its mobile and remote firing unit configuration also makes it a key component of MSHORAD (Mobile Short-Range Air Defense), giving forces a significant tactical advantage through rapid deployment and flexible positioning.

At the same time, soft-kill solutions such as jamming, nets, and “hunter drones” are becoming increasingly important. Together with startups and industry partners, Saab continues to research new technologies to counter both current and future threats. However, no single “golden solution” exists.

Modern drone warfare requires layered defence concepts built around different systems adapted to regional threats and operational requirements. The layered cost logic must be embedded in these architectures from the outset: the right capability, at the right cost, against the right threat. Closer cooperation within NATO is becoming ever more important, although national security priorities still dominate many defence strategies.

Ultimately, the central lesson from Ukraine is clear: C-UAS is not just a technical defence problem. It is a networked, economic and institutional adaptation race. The key challenge is no longer technology alone, but speed: speed of innovation, integration, interoperability, training, and tactical adaptation. There is no universal answer to drone warfare, but there is an urgent need to deploy effective and scalable C-UAS capabilities now.