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Saab Global
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Seabed Operations

8 min read

As far back as 2020 report ‘High Value of the North Sea’ from The Hague Centre of Strategic Studies highlighted the economic significance and vulnerabilities
of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI). Incidents, particularly in the Baltic Sea, confirm these vulnerabilities. Sabotage operations aim to undermine Western support for Ukraine, NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, and disrupt
the Baltic States’ energy independence efforts.

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In the Baltic Sea, where up to 15% of global cargo traffic is handled, the described scenarios pose a significant threat to national security and hinder investments in offshore economic activities, such as sea-based windfarms, which are crucial for achieving energy transition goals. Western countries bordering the North Sea are being forced to take a robust deterrent stance and develop capabilities to defend against acts of sabotage. No easy task, because hardly any other place has more complex demands on high-tech surveillance and protection systems than the sea.

Underwater operations are confronted with a multitude of challenges, be it strong currents, temperature and pressure in the deep sea or limited visibility. For a mission to be successful, it therefore requires powerful, robust and high-tech solutions that, in the best case, fulfil multi-purpose functions and act autonomously to minimise the risk to personnel and reduce costs. France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Sweden are just a few of the countries that have revised their strategies for fighting on the seabed in recent years and are now investing in state-of-the-art equipment.

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A multitude of actions must be taken

When it comes to hostile attacks below the surface of the water, there is not just one measure that needs to be taken. Seabed warfare consists of many disciplines, and only their coherent deployment will lead to the desired effect: first, physical protection by improved cable and pipeline de-sign, such as the use of strong materials and protective layers, and/or deep burial in the seabed is needed to prevent damage from anchors and trawls. Secondly, contin-uous monitoring by underwater drones and sensors that can also conduct damage analysis, supported by surface surveillance from existing sensors such as radar, AIS and satellite imaging in order to track suspicious surface vessel movements. Suspicious underwater activities, such as drones or trawling can be detected by sonar and acoustic sensors, and GPS trackers warn of unwanted movements nearby. Thirdly, the near-real-time data provided by all these means must be fused into a situational awareness picture and tagged with intelligence information. The data must then be analyed and correlated for any anomalies, irregularities and suspicious behaviour, ideally with the support of AI for real-time reporting systems to give instant warnings of potential threats. This may lead to rapid communication and action in case of sabotage or damage, such as emergency response teams being deployed to intervene directly. Fourth, underwater drones and sabotage protection must be used and further developed, for example electromagnetic jamming or sonar pulses to disable hostile drones or automatic interception drones to neutralise suspicious objects. And finally, geofencing around infrastructure and ca-bles can create virtual zones in which unauthorised objects are detected and blocked. This list alone shows the complexity and diversity of the task. Saab follows a comprehensive approach to critical undersea infrastructure with a broad portfolio of different sen-sors, manned and unmanned platforms - below and above the surface.

International regulation and cooperation

One nation alone cannot secure and protect the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the Western nations must cooperate in protecting cables and pipelines. They must share information on risk areas and introduce regulations that prohibit anchoring in high-risk areas and that keep shipping lanes clear of cables, especially alongside mandatory shipping routes, to minimize the risk of damage. Additionally, societies must enhance their resilience to the disruptive consequences of such damage. And there must also be clear responsibilities. Currently, many authorities at regional, national and international level are involved in protecting critical undersea infrastructure, such as coast guards, the navy, the police, maritime law enforcement right through to telecom organisations. This makes it more difficult to implement a clear strategy. Stronger cooperation between nations, organisations and the industry would be a major step forward in dividing up complex tasks and ensuring that we take action. In 2024, Norway and Germany launched a joint initiative to strengthen NATO’s role in protecting critical undersea infrastructure. Both countries proposed the creation of regional CUI hubs for different maritime areas in NATO’s scope of responsibility such as the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Atlan-tic Ocean and others. The idea is that these hubs can then be provided by one or a group of allies.

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A question of precision

Having delivered over 900 vehicle systems worldwide – from work class Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs), inspection and observation ROVs, survey ROVs, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), ROV tooling –, Saab is one of the leading suppliers for both commercial and military applications. Through constant innovations, the company is entrusted with handling complex tasks in some of the world’s most challenging environments. In coastal areas, the Double Eagle family system, which is in service with na-val forces around the world, is suitable for countering a wide variety of threats below the surface. The vehicles – Double Eagle MDS, SAROV and MuMNS – can be launched from any type of ship, from the shore or from a suitable vehicle and ensure safe, cost-efficient and reliable Mine Countermeasures (MCM) at operational depths of up to 500 metres. While the Double Eagle Mine Disposal System (MDS) is the market-leading solution for the disposal of unexploded mines, the versatile hybrid system Semi-Autonomous Remotely Operated Vehicle (SAROV) can be used both au-tonomously for detection, classification and identification, and remotely for mine-clearance. SAROV's robust design and modularity ensure exceptional performance and pro-vide significant range and endurance. The Multi-shot Mine Neutralisation System (MuMNS) offers a new generation of mine neutralisation and immunisation. The ROV is highly effective and manoeuvrable with six degrees of freedom and is equipped with advanced sensors for accurate mine identification. MuMNS improves the pace of operations and thus simultaneously reduces the costs of MCM operations. Also highly effective in localising, identifying and neutralis-ing IEDs, especially in confined areas and challenging conditions like strong current, ports and harbours is Saab’s Sea Wasp. Designed to be operated by as few as two people, the system can easily be configured to meet the requirements of any mission and includes a vehicle, generator, pilot station, winch and power supply unit. It can be piloted from the surface using a control console located onboard a support vessel or from a vehicle, on dock. Sea Wasp’s onboard Doppler Velocity Log (DVL) and Internal Measurement Unit (IMU) deliver navigational capability, allowing it to record and transmit specific waypoints. The vehicle itself incorpo-rates Saab's unique iCON intelligent control system for exceptional maneuverability.

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If an attack cannot be prevented, the resulting damage must be repaired as soon as possible. Maintenance and servicing work on critical undersea infrastructure is also constantly required. Sabertooth is a powerful yet lightweight platform that is available in both single- and dual-hull versions. For this purpose, Saab has combined military and commercial ROV/AUV technology. Thanks to its small size, wireless operation and manoeuvrability, Sabertooth ensures easy and safe access inside and around complex structures – ideal for offshore surveying and the autonomous inspection, maintenance and repair (IMR) of underwater installations and tunnels. Sabertooth can swim autonomously to the docking unit and remain there for up to 24 hours. When using a ‘garage’ on the seabed, it can even go without maintenance for up to six months, thus eliminating the costs of surface vessels. This floating deep-water hybrid AUV/ROV benefits from 360-degree manoeuvrability with six degrees of freedom and interfaces for sensors and additional equipment.

The urgency is growing

The European Union and NATO launched a joint task force on resilience and critical infrastructure protection in 2023 to further develop and coordinate capabilities in the Baltic Sea. This is a clear commitment to ensuring maritime security and protecting critical infrastructure, while also underlining the urgency and importance of these issues at an international level. However, time is running out and a harmonised and coordinated approach as soon as possible is absolutely crucial. The cooperation between allies, as well as the combination of technical, operational and legal countermeasures, can significantly reduce the vulnerability of seabed cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and other risk areas. Detecting and countering threats to critical underwater infrastructure requires joint operations and a comprehensive defence and security capability. Such a capability must ensure effective, efficient and affordable protection through the integration of technical systems, coordinated proce-dures and strategic foresight. A strong collaboration with the industry is also essential for the protection of communication, energy and internet infrastructure.