Skip to content Go to main navigation Go to language selector
Saab Global
sirius compact l20c b roll.00 00 04 06.still002

Working to fill the gaps in drone defence

4 min read

With thousands of small UAVs at a time now being used in battles, armed forces need a multi-layered approach to drone defence. Saab is looking for smart and cost-effective ways to fill the gap between close- and short-range air defences.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are rewriting military doctrines at a pace that few people could have imagined even a decade ago. In the conflict in Ukraine, drones are being used in their millions, both in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles and to actively engage and destroy the enemy. So important are first-person-view (FPV) drones to Ukraine’s war effort that the nation has reportedly increased its production capacity from two million to five million units a year.

7304447

Global armed forces are sitting up and paying close attention to the situation. Almost all are now enhancing their abilities to produce unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), while also searching for technologies to track and destroy enemy drones. Systems like Loke, which Saab this year developed with the Swedish Armed Forces, combine elements like radar, machines guns and command and control systems to manage incoming drone threats. But with drone swarms becoming bigger and more complex, more solutions are needed – particularly to manage UAVs at close and short range.

This need has inspired Saab engineers to consider potential new counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities that complement existing weapons and fill gaps in the defensive layers. A range of options are showing promise. However, because UAVs are being used in extremely high numbers, any potential new solution must be able to neutralise multiple drones in a cost-effective way and without placing undue stress on supply lines or manufacturing capabilities. At the same time, because of the speed at which drone attacks can occur, it must be agile, intuitive and simple to use.

So, where do the gaps lie in defending against drones? And exactly what kind of solutions might be used to plug them?

Time for a new defensive layer

Currently, well-organised armed forces use a layered approach to air defence, whether defending groups of deployed troops or valuable assets or pieces of infrastructure. Different types of defences are used to protect from attack at different ranges, with these deterrents overlapping to provide full coverage. MSHORAD systems, for example, are typically used to take down threats that are up to a few kilometres away, with Saab’s RBS 70 NG capable of destroying targets at a distance of nine kilometres. Close-up defences against drone threats can include machine guns and kamikaze defensive drones, piloted remotely by pilots on the ground. Saab’s Loke approach involves using the Saab Trackfire remote weapons station in combination with ground radar and command and control solutions to identify and destroy drones. While jamming technology can play a role by interrupting the signal between remote enemy pilots and drones, the increased use of fully autonomous drones is removing this advantage.

5691889
5714110

One potential and significant gap in layered drone defence approaches lies in managing threats in the middle distance, between close and short range. At a distance of two, three or four kilometres, machine guns are not effective, and it can be hard to get enough FPV kamikaze drones in the air in time to ward off an attack. Enemy drone pilots are often highly trained and expert at defensive manoeuvres, making it extremely hard to neutralise them with conventional weapons. While MSHORAD missiles are effective, their use is not always cost effective. Spending multiple tens of thousands of dollars at a time to take down individual drones that the enemy has commissioned for a few hundred dollars also has the potential to strain supply chains. 

Potential solution 

But there is hope on the horizon. Maybe a new type of anti-drone missile. A missile with the same kind of small-drone-killing power as an MSHORAD missile but that is more economical to produce and easier to distribute, could solve many of the challenges. It could potentially be produced rapidly and in numbers large enough to match the millions of drones now in production. However, no suitable design is currently in production.

While no clear option for longer distances, an option to guns, has yet emerged, one thing is clear. With the drone threat growing each day more diverse and effective solution is badly needed.