Saab to lead NATO's new underwater battlespace project
The Saab-led MANGROVE consortium has been selected by NATO to lead the Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network project (AUWB-MN). The project formally commenced 1 September 2025 and will deliver interoperability for Maritime Uncrewed Systems and conventional platforms across allied nations.
The project is designing a Reference Architecture and a Test and Reference Environment for a mission network that leverages both crewed and uncrewed systems, above, on and below the water. The mission network will facilitate rapid and secure information exchange, and integration across domains, supporting combined operations between all branches of the military. The outcome is expected to become a new standard for NATO.
All of the MANGROVE consortium's expertise and collaborative focus for the next 12 months will be on the successful development of a mission network for NATO’s operations in the underwater battlespace. As all aspects of the underwater domain grow in their strategic significance, this will be a critical contribution to the collective maritime security and defence.
Critical undersea infrastructure also requires ongoing maintenance and repair. Sabertooth is a powerful and technologically advanced platform available in both single- and double-hull versions, combining Saab’s military technology with commercial ROV/AUV capa-bilities. Thanks to its compact size, wireless operation and agility, the Sabertooth can move easily and safely in and around complex structures. This makes the vehicle ideal for offshore construction work and autonomous inspection, maintenance and repair (IMR) of subsea installations and tunnels.
The strategic importance of seabed operations
Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure impacting energy security, or an increased focus on targeting CUI beyond the Baltic Sea region, such as the Barents Sea or the North Sea, should be considered as potential options for further escalation in the hybrid conflict. Investments in deep-water capacities are more necessary than ever to address these threats today and tomorrow.
When it comes to hostile attacks below the surface of the water, there is not just one measure that needs to be taken. Seabed warfare consists of many disciplines, and only their coherent deployment will lead to the desired effect: first, physical protection by improved cable and pipeline design, such as the use of strong materials and protective layers, and/or deep burial in the seabed is needed to prevent damage from anchors and trawls. Secondly, continuous monitoring by underwater drones and sensors that can also conduct damage analysis, supported by surface surveillance from existing sensors such as radar, AIS and satellite imaging in order to track suspicious surface vessel movements. Suspicious underwater activities, such as the use of drones or trawling, can be detected by sonar and acoustic sensors (both passive and active), while GPS trackers provide warnings of unwanted movements nearby.
Thirdly, the near-real-time data provided by all these means must be fused into a situational awareness picture and tagged with intelligence information. The data must then be analysed and correlated for any anomalies, irregularities and suspicious behaviour, ideally with the support of AI for real-time reporting systems to give instant warnings of potential threats. This may lead to rapid communication and action in case of sabotage or damage, such as emergency response teams being deployed to intervene directly.
Fourth, underwater drones and sabotage protection must be used and further developed, for example electromagnetic jamming or sonar pulses to disable hostile drones or automatic interception drones to neutralise suspicious objects. And finally, geofencing around infrastructure and cables can create virtual zones in which unauthorised objects are detected and blocked. This list alone shows the complexity and diversity of the task. Saab follows a comprehensive approach to critical undersea infrastructure with a broad portfolio of different sensors, manned and unmanned platforms - below and above the surface.
Seabed Operations
As far back as 2020 report ‘High Value of the North Sea’ from The Hague Centre of Strategic Studies highlighted the economic significance and vulnerabilities of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI). Incidents, particularly in the Baltic Sea, confirm these vulnerabilities. Sabotage operations aim to undermine Western support for Ukraine, NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, and disrupt the Baltic States’ energy independence efforts.